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Abstract
In this paper we study Brain Drain (BD) and Fiscal Competition
(FC) in a unified framework for the European Union (EU) specific
context. Potential mobility of educated workers can increase the
degree of FC through taxation or the provision of public education.
An increase in FC can be caused by competition among diﬀerent
jurisdictions that aim to attract educated workers. When the im-
portance of FC increases, then the European States may employ FC
as a new policy tool. First, we analyze FC and BD with reference to
EU regions. In this instance, the EU may find incentive to control
the interactions between BD and FC in order to coordinate fiscal
policies and/or the provision of public goods as education. Sec-
ond, we furthermore consider the entry of new state inside the EU.
The absence of coordination implies that, in addition to the FC, a
“migration competition” may be generated in EU, where the region
inside the union try to attract educated workers of the new entry.
We derive the conditions which BD leads to a decrease (increase) in
welfare and growth for new entry country.
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1 Introduction
In the European Union (EU hereafter) context, mobility of European citizens is
free of institutional constrains so that cultural integration increases the prob-
ability to migrate inside the Union. For this reason, workers flows acquired a
relevant position in the EU research agenda. The study of the Brain Drain (BD
hereafter) is linked with the choice of education for both workers and/or by gov-
ernments. If education is a public good, educated workers are free to migrate,
as a side eﬀect Fiscal Competition (FC hereafter) can arise. If governments do
not coordinate taxation and provision of public goods, then the economy may
suﬀer strong negative externalities. In fact, if the growth of the economies is
associated with educated workers, we may record lower taxation, worse income
redistribution, and lower provision of public goods. Furthermore, the system
may record lower growth.
A though BD and FC are connected thorough agents mobility, the literature
studied them separately due to the complexity of a joint analysis. In partic-
ular, previous studies developed two separate branches for BD and FC. The
first one focuses on BD in a macroeconomic setup and studies its impact on
the growth of diﬀerent economies. The second one analyses FC using microe-
conomics tools and focuses on competitive interactions between workers and
Jurisdictions. Several studies are focused on externalities stemming out from
human capital migration but all these studies analyze only indirectly the inter-
action between BD and FC and so they are not adequate to simulate the new
European framework. In fact, in the past this BD was an unidirectional flow
of highly skilled labor from third-world countries and so the literature has ex-
plained the lower provision of human capital as a “negative fiscal externalities”
due to migration1. More recently, increased integration in the labor markets,
especially within the EU, has drawn attention to problems that arise from bi-
directional movement of skilled labor between similarly developed countries. It
is so necessary to define a new BD typology specific to the European context
where the FC can be used as a “new policy tools” by the regions. Furthermore,
when we analyze the enlarged EU then we can distinguish two diﬀerent “clubs”
of region, the former, with higher growth, and the new entries with lower growth
and labour productivity. In this new context a new specification of BD and FC
can arise. The Former regions can compete to attract the educate workers of the
new regions by use the FC tool. This “migration competition”, in the absence
1Berry and Soligo (1969), for example, show that as far as the production of human capital
(i.e. schooling and professional or academic education) is subsidized, the emigration country
loses human capital when people with human capital leave their origin. Consequently (and
according to the theory of public goods) the production of human capital in the emigration
countries is too low in comparison to a world without migration. Bhagwaty (1976a) shows the
existence of a negative fiscal externality on the emigration country, if education is publicly
subsidized. If the economy wide education is expanded in response to emigration the govern-
mental deficit increases ceteris paribus. This eﬀect is accelerated, if the newly educated are
less gifted. Furthermore educational subsidies can be regarded as an investment of the old
generation into their pension which is lost in case of permanent emigration (Grubel & Scott,
1977).
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of a specific coordination inside the EU can generate strong negative external-
ities to the new entry. There exist numerously examples of the FC and the
“migration competition” in EU.
For example, much of the discussion of the migration of highly skilled has
focused on the potential BD from east to west. Statistics2 show a migration of
scientific personal from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to Western
Europe.
Tackling financial barriers to researcher mobility could be done by following
the Scandinavian example. A recent Swedish policy of reducing the tax burden
for high level researchers going to Sweden for three years. Similar initiatives
are being implemented in Denmark. Furthermore, scrutiny of the work permit
system of most European states indicates clearly that professional, managerial
and technical constitute the bulk of those accepted: in UK for example, they
are accounted for around 80 per cent of all work permit issues. Within Western
Europe, a complex series of “Brain exchanges” has developed, superimposed
upon free movement system inherent in the operation of the European Economic
Area (EEA).
In the last years, several countries in Western Europe have taken steps to
increase their immigration of skilled workers. Germany has introduced a “Green
Card” system to attract 20,000 IT workers to fill shortages, although there are
still diﬃculties in finding enough potential migrants with the necessary skills.
The UK government has also adopted a more positive attitude towards skilled
labor migration, making changes to the work permit system which are designed
to increase the inflow of a range of skilled occupations, including IT and medical
personnel3.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the structure
of the model. In Section 3 we solve the model in an “autarchic context” where
there is no migration. In Section 4 we describe the “restricted mobility case”
where there is migration of educated worker inside the EU. In Section 5 we
describe the “enlarged mobility case”, where we analyze the entrance of a new
state into the EU.
2See, for example, Wolburg (1996, 1997) and Wolburg & Wolter (1997)
3See Salt (2001); Bauer and Zimmermann (1999) Salt, Compton, Densham, Hogarth, and
Schmidt, (1999); Daudersta¨dt (2001); Straubhaar (2000).
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1.1 Survey of the literature on the Brain Drain
Brain Drain is an expression of British origin commonly used to describe one
of the most sensitive areas in the transfer of technology. It refers to skilled
professionals who leave their native lands in order to seek more promising op-
portunities elsewhere.
Causes Migration of this type has been linked to several possible causes.
The most frequently cited are the lack of employment opportunities for returning
graduates, lower salary levels in the indigenous country, preference of graduates
to live abroad, asymmetric information in the labor market4, diﬀerent fiscal and
social packages5 and the incentive to finance education6.
4Kwok Viem (1982) suggests as cause for the exodus of foreign -trained students: asymmet-
ric information in the labor market. That is, employers in the country training the students
have a more accurate (but not necessarily more optimistic) judgment of the true productivity
of students than have employers in the students’ native country. This asymmetry results from
foreign employers’ familiarity with their own academic system and with the curricula oﬀered
by diﬀerent schools; their past experience in hiring large numbers of both foreign and domestic
graduates of their universities; and the in-depth interviews which are a regular part of the
employment process in many Western countries, and particularly in the United States. He
also shows that the graduates who do return tend to be those of lesser productivity than those
who remain abroad.
5When the choice is among countries, rather than among municipalities, mobility is much
less, and the fiscal and social packages can be, and are, much more diﬀerent. But the basic
point [based on the model of Charles Tiebout’s (1956) which explains how political jurisdiction
s can oﬀer quite diﬀerent packages of services and tax rates, and where individuals vote with
their feet to find the packages most suiting their tastes and values] remains those who move
face, not only diﬀerent taxes rates but diﬀerent patterns and types of public services, as
well. Perhaps even more relevant to the study of migration of the well- educated and well-
oﬀ countries diﬀer, not only in their average taxes rates and in the size and eﬃciency of
their public services and transfer payments, but also in the distribution of costs and benefits
among diﬀerent groups of taxpayers and beneficiaries. Among those who do migrate whether
domestically or abroad, the highly educated are over-represented, partly because they are
more likely to posses skills that are in demand, but also because they are more likely to have
contacts in and knowledge about possible places to move. To extent that migration of the
highly skilled may to be triggered by diﬀerent factors, survey data reported by Grubel and
Scott (1966, 1976) suggests that job opportunities and challenges are even more important to
the highly educated. It is also true that for many such workers, particularly in health care,
education, and government-supported fundamental research, the 1990s have seen large cuts
in government spending induced by budget pressures. For example the pre tax and post tax
distributions of the income have become more unequal in the US relative to Canada. All
of these factors may have increased the net attraction of migration for the better-educated.
[Helliwell 1999]
6Beyond the overall package of taxes and public services, special attention has been given,
especially in the context of BD discussions, to the structure of education finance. Many com-
mentators have argued that because BD migrants take their taxpayer-supported educational
capital with them, they should face an exit tax or an educational loan that is forgiven only
for those who stay and work where they acquired their subsidized education.
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Welfare and growth eﬀects The BD literature is linked to the concept
of ”human capital” and its measurement has been developed by Schultz (1960)
and Becker (1964). Positive technological externalities of immigration arise by
the additional capital that is available to the host economy. The theoretical
argument goes back to the development literature of 50’s (Hirschman, Myrdal,
Perroux, Wallerstein) They have seen a revival in the mid-1980’s with the birth
of the so called New Growth Theory. Starting with Paul Romer (1986, 1987,
1990) and Robert Lucas (1988) the immigration of skilled migrants has been
evaluated as stimulating for the dynamics of economic growth.
The possibility that the welfare of those remaining in the LDCs could be
reduced by an outflow of educated manpower had been recognized in the liter-
ature as well. From the work of Grubel and Scott, Berry and Soligo, and Harry
Johnson in the 1960s, the main conclusion was that welfare of non-migrants
would fall only if the migrants’ contribution to national output were greater
than their income (or consumption in a static model). For a number of reasons
the literature believes that the conditions for a BD to be welfare-deteriorating
are often verified. Diﬀerently from the standard results, Mountford (1997) find
some conditions in which BD generates positive externalities for the regions
where some educated workers migrate7.
Furthermore there are diﬀerent studies about the BD8 and considerable at-
tention has been given to a proposal of Bhagwati’s for a “brain drain tax” which
would reduce the incentives for such a migration to take place9. Finally there
are diﬀerent methodologies to compute these benefits and costs. For example
Usher (1977) suggests that “an assessment of the costs and benefits of migra-
tion need take account of the fact that a large portion of a country’s property
is publicly owned, so that a migrant on going from one country to another must
as a rule abandon his share of publicly owned property of origin and acquire a
share of publicly owned property in his country of destination. The emigrant
exchange his right to send his children to school in his country of origin for
the right to send his children in his country of destination, reducing the need
for new school building in the former country and increasing it according in
the latter”.Grubel and Scott (1976) point out that ”since our concern is with
the gains to the United States, it is appropriate to use U.S. prices, so that our
computations amount to estimating what it would have cost to bring a native
American to the level of education held by the average immigrant at the time
he arrives”.
7He shows that when migration is not a certainty, a BD may increase average
productivity and equality in the source economy even though average produc-
tivity is a positive function of the past average levels of human capital in an
economy.
8See Bhagwati and Hamada (1974); Bhagwati and Rodriguez (1975a; 1975b); McCulloch
and Yellen (1975); Blomqvis (1986); Bodenhofer (1967); Sjaastad (1962); Rodriguez (1975);
Romans (1974); Edding and Bodenhofer (1966); Johnson (1965); Kesselman (2000).
9Bhagwati and Dellafar (1973), Bhagwati (1975,1976a, 1976b) and Hamada (1977).
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Public good provision eﬀects If one assumes that the allocation to hu-
man capital investments made by the region (e.g., local expenditures or state
support for education in the national framework and national investment out-
lays in the international setting) depends on the returns expected to accrue
internally (as the individual investment decisions are assumed to be determined
by expected private returns), the existence of external benefits from investments
made by a region will cause suboptimal allocation judged from marginal pro-
ductivity rules10.
The cost of education would be irrelevant to the assignment of gains and
losses from migration if each man paid the full cost of his education, but it
becomes important when education is subsidized or provided free of charge by
the state. It is sometimes supposed that there is an implicit contract between
the student and the state in which the latter supplies education at less than
cost on the understanding that the net income of educated labor will one way
another, be less than its marginal product. The immigration of educated labor
generates the benefits of this arrangement without the cost11.
10There is a large literature on the eﬃcency properties of a system of competing regional
jurisdictions. One strand is the fiscal externality literature. The standard conclusion in
this literature is that there is an externality associated with an individual’s migration that
generally leads to an ineﬃcient distribution of population across region.
11Education in general accounts for as much as of 5% of GNP, and 10% or more of pub-
lic spending in advanced industrialized countries, with public funding covering, on average,
almost 90% of education costs in these countries. Higher education typically accounts for
15-20% of overall education expenditures. Migration of skilled labor implies that those who
pay the bill for public higher education may find it diﬃcult to fully capture its benefits.
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2 The model
The model we analyze in this paper is based on Mountford (1997)12.
The literature on BD identifies a negative externality of BD on regions
growth. Diﬀerently from standard results, the Mountford’s model finds some
conditions in which BD generates positive externalities for the regions where
some educated workers migrate13. This interesting result opens the way for a
better identification of the negative eﬀect generated by the mutual interaction of
FC and BD. We extend the Mountford’s model in diﬀerent directions. First, we
introduce a role for the government in the educational decisions of agents though
the introduction of educational subsidies and taxation. Second, we study the
specific case in which the region analyzed is a member of the European Union
where the mobility of workers is freely allowed14.
The model analyses a small open economy, under perfect capital mobility,
with only one good produced under constant returns to scale by two factors,
capital and eﬃciency units of labor. There is a continuum of agents within each
generation15. The education decision is assumed to be a discrete choice: agents
can choose either to be educated or not be educated.
Productive sector Let us define Kt to be the total amount of capital
in time period t and Lt to be the eﬃciency units of labor. The productivity
of labor (or the state of technology) in period t is given by λt. Production
is generated by a constant returns to scale production functions. The output
produced at time t, Yt , is
Yt= F (Kt,λtLt) = f(kt)λtLt (1)
where
kt =
Kt
λtLt
(2)
We make the standard assumptions about this function, namely
12This model is a simple version of Miyagiwa (1991) studiing of the model of the brain drain
and human capital formation.
13See note (7)
14In this analysis we do not take in account redistribution policies of the gov-
ernments. If we take in account the redistribution policies we accentuate the negative eﬀects
of the FC. According to the literature we will obtain less redistribution and less provision of
public good with respect to the eﬃcient value (which could be obtained in the absence of mo-
bility or in the presence of coordination among jurisdictions). In Giannoccolo and Marchand
(mimeo) we have analyzed the negative externalities due to FC and to educated migration
and we have analyzed their eﬀect on the redistribution policies and on the supply of education
as public good.
15For simplicity we normalize the population in each generation to unity.
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f(k) > 0, f´(k) > 0, f´(k) < 0,∀k > 0 (3)
and the “Inada conditions”
lim
k→0
f(k) = 0, lim
k→0
f´(k) =∞, lim
k→∞
f´(k) = 0 (4)
Factor prices are determined in the standard way by the factor’s marginal
product, thus the net return to capital rt is equal to f´(kt) + (1− δ), where δ is
the capital stock depreciation rate. Let us assume for simplicity that the world
is in a steady state equilibrium and thus that the world net rate of return, r∗,
is constant. Due to the perfect capital mobility and the narrow dimension of
the economy, this fixes the domestic net rate of return to capital, rt, equal to
r∗ and thus fixes the domestic capital to eﬃciency labor ratio, kt, as well. Thus
kt = k ∀t where k is a constant. Given the level of technology λt, k determines
the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor, w(k).
wt= λt [f (k)− kf´ (k)]= λtw(k) (5)
The distribution of ability Individuals possess diﬀerent levels of latent
ability, where ei denotes the latent ability level of individual i. These latent
abilities are assumed to be distributed over the closed interval [0, E] according
to the density function g
¡
ei
¢
, where, by definition
Z E
0
g
¡
ei
¢
dei = 1 ; g
¡
ei
¢
> 0 ∀ei ∈ [0, E] (6)
Let us assume that all generations have latent abilities which are picked up from
the same distribution and that the abilities of children are independent from the
abilities of their parents16.
The growth externality Let us assume that there is an economy wide
growth externality related to the proportion of educated workers in the economy
in the previous period st−1. Thus we model λt to be a positive function of the
proportion of educated workers in the previous period, that is
λt = λ (st−1)where st−1 =
Z E
e∗t−1
g
¡
ei
¢
dei (7)
Let’s also assume that λ (0) = 1 and that λ (1) is finite.
16In a second step this assumption could be substituted by the assumption of externalities
of the education of the precedent education.
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Region’s gain from education Let us define ΩJt a measure of the welfare
of region J17.
ΩJt ≡ s
J,J
t
"
λ
¡
sJt−1
¢
w (k)
Z E
e∗Jt
dei,t
#
+ sI,Jt
"
λ
¡
sIt−1
¢
w (k)
Z E
e∗It
dei,t
#
+
− sJt [c (1 + r∗)] + Z(s
J,J
t + s
I,J
t ) with J, I = A,B (8)
where sJ,Jt is the number of agents which are educated in region J at time t
and work in region J at t+ 1; sI,Jt is the number of agents which are educated
in region I at time t and work in region J at time t + 1. The first and the
second term on the right hand side of (8) denote the total production of region
J due to the presence of educated workers. The third term corresponds to the
education costs in region J . The fourth term is an increasing function of the
number of educated agents and denotes all the other gains (not only pecuniary)
that the presence of educated gives to region J .
Moreover, let us assume that Z(·) ≥ 0, Z(0) = 0 and Z0(·) > 0
Education’s role of the government: taxes and subsidies Let us now
assume that the government subsidizes part of the educational costs sustained18.
The government influences the education decision of the agents by taxing the
educated workers and covering part of their education costs19. Let us define
the education subsidy, γt, as the unit of output reimbursed to educated agents
in generation t. Thus, the eﬀective individual cost of being educated becomes
(c− γt) (1 + r∗) with γt ∈ [0, c]
Let us define Tt to be the marginal rate of taxation of educated workers in
generation t. Introducing taxation, the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor
becomes wt = w (k) [1− Tt].
For each time t the government J maximizes the ΩJt subject to a balance con-
straint for each generation t. Let us, furthermore, assume that the government
decides independently by the positive externality of education of generation t
for the future generations and that the balance constraint is binding.
So we have
[γt (1 + r
∗)] sJt = [λtw (k)Tt]h
J
t (9)
17This is a non-standard function of social welfare. It is a gross measure of the region’s
gain derived from education and it allows to compare the diﬀerent scenarios analyzed in this
model.
18These subsidies are given directly to educated. The analysis does not change if we con-
sider an equivalent average education investment of the government (academic and research
infrastructures, school places, teachers, etc.).
19We assume that only the educated workers are taxed. Then we focus our analysis on a
particular quota of the taxation reserved to pay the education’s subsidies.
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where sJt is the number of educated workers of generation t born in region J
and hJt is the number of educated agents of generation t those work in region
J .
The individual’s decision to be educated Agents live in a overlapping
generations world and live for three periods, deriving utility only from the third
period consumption20. In their first period of life agents can invest resources
in education. They have not resources of their own, so they must borrow from
the capital market at the world’s rate of interest, r∗. Let us assume the cost
of education to be fixed at c units of output. Agents that invest in education
obtain ei eﬃciency units of labor in their second period of life, where ei is the
level of the latent ability of agent i. Furthermore let’s assume that the agents
who do not invest in education have only one eﬃciency unit of labor in their
second period of the life. Agents can only work in their second period of life
and in this period the agent must repay the debt of the first period. In the third
period they are retired and use their savings to consume. All agents have the
same preferences and access to the same technology, although they do not have
the same levels of latent ability.
The optimal decision for agent i will be to invest in education if
[1− Tt]λtw(k)ei > λtw(k) + (c− γt) (1 + r∗) (10)
In each period t we assume that sJt−1 is given, then
λ
¡
sJt−1
¢
wJ (k) ≡ a (11)
Thus, all agents with a latent ability greater than e∗ will invest in education,
were e∗ is uniquely defined by the following equality:
e∗J =
a+ (1 + r∗)
£
c− γJt
¤¡
1− T Jt
¢
a
(12)
Let us assume that the model is such that e∗t ∈ [0 + ε, E − ε] , where 0 < ε < E2 .
Dynamics and steady state productivity The only dynamics in the
model derive from the growth externality. From equation (7) it is clear that the
proportion of workers who are educated at time t is an increasing function of
the proportion of workers who were educated at time t− 1, that is
st = ψ (st−1) (13)
20The introduction of three periods is necessary because agents borrow to finance their first
period of life and they can evidently not borrow from agents who will not be alive to be repaid
in the next period.
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Since
∂e∗t
∂st−1
=
λ´
¡
sJt−1
¢
(1 + r∗)
¡
c− γJt
¢
λ2
¡
sJt−1
¢
w(k)
£
1− T Jt
¤ (14)
Thus
∂st
∂st−1
= g
¡
e∗Jt
¢ λ´ ¡sJt−1¢ (1 + r∗) ¡c− γJt ¢
λ2
¡
sJt−1
¢
w(k)
£
1− T Jt
¤ (15)
Let us assume that E is high enough so that the most able worker will always
chooses to be educated even if no one was educated in the previous period. Since
we know that agent i with ei = 0 will never choose to be educated, then this
implies that there must exist at least one steady state equilibrium for st, which
we denote as s¯. Whether this is a unique steady state depends on the properties
of the function λt = λ (st−1). If this function has convex regions, representing
“critical masses” of educated people in the economy, then there my be multiple
steady states. The unique Steady State case is depicted in figure 1.
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Figure 1: Ψ0 (st) indicates the proportion of educated agents in autarkic case, when there
is not migration and there are government’s subsidies. Ψm (st) indicates the proportion of
educated agents in autarkic case,when there is not migration and there are not government’s
subsidies to educated.
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3 Autarchic case
In this section we solve the model in an “autarchic context” where there is not
migration.
Let us recover the timing of the model.
Time t The government decides Tt and γt and each agent i decides whether to
invest in education or not according to their latent ability ei. Agents who
invest in education receive γt and borrow c− γt from the capital market.
Time t+ 1 The educated agents pay Tt to their government and repay the debt of
the first period of the life.
Time t+ 2 All agents are retired and use their savings to consume.
It is possible to solve the maximization problem through the Backward In-
duction method (BI hereafter). First we solve the maximization problem of the
agents at time t+1 and then we solve the maximization problem of government.
The agent’s decision is given by equation (12).
Let us define ΩJ1,t a measure of the welfare of region J in the autarchic case
when the government introduces taxes and subsidies. Equation (8) becomes
ΩJ1,t ≡ s
g,J
t
"
λ
³
sg,Jt−1
´
w (k)
Z E
e∗gJt
dei,t − c (1 + r∗)
#
+ Z(sg,Jt ) ∀t with J = A,B
(16)
Furthermore, in an autarchic case we have sJt = h
J
t so the equation (9)
becomes
γJt =
a
(1 + r∗)
T Jt (17)
The maximizations for the government is
Max
TJt
: sg,Jt
"
a
Z E
e∗gJt (T
J
t )
dei,t − c (1 + r∗)
#
+ Z(sg,Jt ) (18)
The First Order Condition is
Foc(T
J
t ) :
∂sg,Jt
∂T Jt
"
a
Z E
e∗gJt (T
J
t )
dei,t − c (1 + r∗)
#
+sg,Jt
Ã
−a∂e
∗g,J
t
∂T Jt
!
+
+ Z0(·)∂s
g,J
t
∂T Jt
= 0 (19)
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By
∂sg,Jt
∂TJt
= −∂e
∗g,J
t
∂TJt
g
³
e∗g,Jt
´
and by the optimal value of e∗gJ equation (19)
becomes
ag
³
e∗g,Jt
´Z E
e∗gJt (T
J
t )
dei,t −
£¡
1− T Jt
¢
a
¡
e∗gJ − 1
¢¤
g
³
e∗g,Jt
´
+ asg,Jt +
+ Z0(·)g
³
e∗g,Jt
´
= 0 (20)
The optimal value of the taxation T ∗Jt (and indirectly, by the equation (17),
the optimal value of the subsidies to educated) is
T ∗Jt = 1−
h
E − e∗gJt
i
+ 1
g(e∗g,Jt )
R E
e∗gJt
g
¡
ei
¢
dei,t + Z
0(·)
(e∗gJ − 1) (21)
3.1 Role of government on the region growth
If we analyze the model in absence of government subsidies (Mountford case)
equation (12) becomes
e∗J =
a+ (1 + r∗) c
a
≡ e∗m (22)
Comparing expression (12) and (22) we have that



if T Jt = 0 then e
∗J
t = e
∗m
t
if T JMaxt > T
J
t > 0 then e
∗J
t < e
∗m
t
if T Jt ≥ T JMaxt then e∗Jt ≥ e∗mt
(23)
where
T JMaxt ≡
γJt (1 + r
∗)
(a+ (1 + r∗) c)
(24)
Let us define ΩJ0,t as a measure of the welfare of region J in autarchic context
and in absence of government subsidies and taxations.
ΩJ0,t ≡ smJt
"
λ
¡
smJt−1
¢
w (k)
Z E
e∗mt
dei,t − c (1 + r∗)
#
+ Z(smJt ) ∀t with J = A,B
(25)
Summing up,∀ T Jt ∈
£
0, T JMaxt
¤
we have that
R E
e∗gt
g
¡
ei
¢
dei,t ≥
R E
e∗mt
g
¡
ei
¢
dei.
In presence of subsidies to educated workers, there is an increase in the number
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of the educated in region J . This increase implies a positive externality on the
growth of the economy J . Comparing equation (16) and (25) it is straightfor-
ward to verify that ΩJ1,t > Ω
J
0,t > 0 ∀ T Jt ∈
£
0, T JMaxt
¤
, with J = A,B.
The only diﬀerence between expression (16) and (25) is the number of ed-
ucated workers. In figure (2) is shown the eﬀect of taxation on the welfare
function. The government increase the number of educated workers by decreas-
ing the education cost of the agents with lower latent ability and financing these
subsidies by taxing more the agent with higher latent ability. When the number
of educated workers increase two welfare and growth eﬀects arise. First, if there
are multiple steady state equilibria then the economy can move from a low to a
high education steady state. Second, there is a positive eﬀect on welfare which
is show by function Z(·). If we assume that in Z(·) explains also the more future
growth of a region which increases the number of their educated workers then
it is straightforward to verify that the introduction of subsidies implies more
growth.
The results obtained in this section can be summarized by the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 In an autarchic context, the introduction of government ’s sub-
sidies to educated increases the number of educated agents and has positive eﬀect
on the growth of the economy if and only if 0 < T Jt ≤
γJt (1+r
∗)
(a+(1+r∗)c) ≡ T JMaxt .
In this situation, the presence of the government moves the economy in a new
context which is PO with respect to the Mountford case. The more T Jt is closed
to T JMaxt , the more the number of educated agents is closed to the maximum
and so the more is the growth of the economy.
The steady state of the two cases is shown in figure 1.
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Figure 2: Taxation eﬀects
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4 Mobility case (restricted case)
Let us introduce in the model workers mobility. We examine the case in which
only the educated agents can migrate (BD)21. Let us assume that a small econ-
omy is member of an economic union like the EU so that the educated workers
can migrate inside the union without impediments. We assume that there are
only two regions A and B22. In this section, we also assume that for the region
inside the Union there is a total impediment to migrate outside the Union.
The timing of the model is the following:
Time t Government decides Tt and γt and each agent i decides whether to invest
in education or not according to their latent ability ei. Agents investing
in education receive γt and borrow c− γt from the capital market.
Time t+ 1 Educated agents decides whether to migrate or not. They pay Tt to the
government of the region in which they work and they repay the debt of
the first period of the life.
Time t+ 2 All agents are retired and use savings to consume.
It is possible to solve the maximization problem through the BI method.
First, we solve the maximization problem of the agents at time t + 1 and
then we solve the maximization problem of government. In period t, the agent i
chooses whether if educate himself or not given the government decisions about
T Jt and γ
J
t with J = A,B. The optimal decision for agent i, born in region J ,
is to invest in education if
argmax
n£
1− T Jt
¤
λJt w
J(k);
£
1− T It
¤
λItw
I(k)
o
ei> λJt w
J(k)+
¡
c− γJt
¢
(1 + r∗)
(26)
In each period t we assume that sg,Jt−1 and s
g,I
t−1 are given then we can write
λ
³
sg,Jt−1
´
wJ (k) ≡ a (27)
λ
³
sg,It−1
´
wI (k) ≡ b (28)
Thus, all agents with a latent ability greater than e∗∗gt invest in education, were
e∗∗ is uniquely defined by the following equality:
21This hypothesis is compatible with the assumption that there are not mobility costs. The
results do not change if we assume that the costs of mobility (transfers’ costs, social costs,
integration’s costs, etc...) are very small for educated workers (closed to zero) and very high
for non educated. It is furthermore possible extend the analysis to the case in which there are
not educational requirement for emigration but becomes hard distinguish the BD aspects of
the workers migration.
22It is possible, without changing the results, assume that the region B represents the rest
of the Union and so the assumption that the region it is a small open economy is verified.
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e∗∗gJt =
a+
¡
c− γJt
¢
(1 + r∗)
argmax
©£
1− T Jt
¤
a;
£
1− T It
¤
b
ª (29)
The same result follows for agent i, born in region I.
e∗∗gIt =
b+
¡
c− γIt
¢
(1 + r∗)
argmax
©£
1− T Jt
¤
a;
£
1− T It
¤
b
ª (30)
In this model we assume that for the educated agents there is not mobility
costs so that educated workers decide whether migrate or not in response to
diﬀerent net wage that they receive. Their future wage is related to the taxa-
tion/subsidies policies of the governments and to the diﬀerences of technology
between regions. It is straightforward to verify that the educated workers will
prefer stay in region J if
T Jt <
a− b+ bT It
a
(31)
We can therefore distinguish three diﬀerent states of the world:
Case (1) T Jt <
a−b+bT It
a all educated migrate in region J .
Case (2) T Jt >
a−b+bT It
a all educated migrate in region I.
Case (3) T Jt =
a−b+bT It
a there is no migration.
In each state of the world, the government maximizes ΩJt subject to a bal-
ance constraint and decides the optimal value of taxation independently by the
positive externality of education of generation t for the future generations.
Let us define ΩJ2,t a measure of the welfare of region J in mobility context
and in presence of government subsidies and taxations.
ΩJ2,t ≡ s
g,J,J
t
"
a
Z E
e∗∗gJt
dei,t
#
+ sg,I,Jt
"
b
Z E
e∗∗gIt
dei,t
#
− sg,Jt [c (1 + r∗)]
+Z(sg,J,Jt + s
g,I,J
t ) with J, I = A,B (32)
Let us define for regions J and I
A = a
"
sg,J,Jt + s
g,I,J
t
sg,Jt
#
(33)
B = b
"
sg,I,It + s
g,J,I
t
sg,It
#
(34)
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The balance constraint of government J is
£
γJt (1 + r
∗)
¤
sg,Jt =(aTt)
h
sg,J,Jt + s
g,I,J
t
i
(35)
By the assumption that it is binding in each period, we obtain the following
equality
γJt =
A
(1 + r∗)
T Jt (36)
The government maximization problem is for the region J
Max
TJt
: sg,J,Jt
"
a
Z E
e∗∗gJt
dei,t
#
+ sg,I,Jt
"
b
Z E
e∗∗gIt
dei,t
#
− sg,Jt [c (1 + r∗)] +
+Z(sg,J,Jt + s
g,I,J
t )
sub to : (1 + r∗) γJt s
g,J
t = T
J
t a
³
sg,J,Jt + s
g,I,J
t
´
(37)
Let us analyze the case in which a > b.
Let us define
η ≡ a− b
a
(38)
Then, equation (36) can be written
T Jt = η+(1− η)T It (39)
The three cases, depicted in figure (3), become
Case (1) T Jt < η + (1− η)T It
Case (2) T Jt > η + (1− η)T It
Case (3) T Jt = η + (1− η)T It
Let us now analyze the government’s decision by using the BI for each dif-
ferent states of the world.
Case (1): T Jt < η + (1− η)T It We have that s
g,J,J
t = s
g,J
t ; s
g,I,J
t = s
g,J
t
and sg,I,It = s
g,J,I
t = 0
The maximization problem of the government becomes
Max
TJt
: sg,Jt
"
a
Z E
e∗∗gJt
dei,t − c (1 + r∗)
#
+ sg,It
"
a
Z E
e∗∗gIt
dei,t
#
+ Z(sg,Jt )
sub to : (1 + r∗) γJt s
g,J
t = T
J
t a
³
sg,Jt + s
g,I
t
´
(40)
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Figure 3: The three cases for the ”diﬀerent technology scenario”
From A = a
h
1 +
sg,It
sg,Jt
i
; B = 0, the (29) becomes
e∗∗gJt =
a+ (1 + r∗) c− a
h
1 +
sg,It
sg,Jt
i
T Jt£
1− T Jt
¤
a
≤ e∗gJt ≤ e∗Jt (41)
The (30) becomes
e∗∗gIt =
b+ (1 + r∗) c£
1− T Jt
¤
a
> e∗gIt (42)
it is furthermore straightforward to verify that
e∗It ≥ e
∗∗gI
t > e
∗gI
t (43)
The First Order Condition is
Foc(T
J
t ) :
∂sg,Jt
∂T Jt
"
a
Z E
e∗+gJt (T
J
t )
dei,t − c (1 + r∗)
#
+sg,Jt
Ã
−a∂e
∗∗g,J
t
∂T Jt
!
+
+ Z0(·)∂s
g,J
t
∂T Jt
= 0 (44)
or
ag
³
e∗∗g,Jt
´Z E
e∗∗gJt (T
J
t )
dei,t − c (1 + r∗) g
³
e∗∗g,Jt
´
+ asg,Jt + Z
0(·)g
³
e∗∗g,Jt
´
= 0
(45)
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from e∗∗gJt we compute
£
1− T Jt
¤
a
³
e∗∗gJt − 1
´
+ a
sg,It
sg,Jt
T Jt = (1 + r
∗) c
We then found the optimal value of the taxation T ∗∗Jt (and, indirectly, the
value of the subsidies to educated).
T Jt = 1−
h
E − e∗∗gJt
i
+ 1
g(e∗∗g,Jt )
R E
e∗∗gJt
g
¡
ei
¢
dei,t + Z
0(·)h³
e∗∗gJt − 1
´
− s
g,I
t
sg,Jt
i ≡ T ∗∗Jt (46)
Comparing equation (46) and (21), it is straightforward to verify that from
(41) derives
T ∗∗Jt < T
∗J
t (47)
For region I, the maximization problem in case (1) becomes
Max
T It
: sg,Jt [−c (1 + r∗)]
sub to : (1 + r∗) γJt s
g,J
t = 0 or γ
J
t = 0 (48)
It is easy to verify that the maximization is solved by
T ∗∗It = 0 (49)
where T ∗∗It < T
∗I
t and where the subsidies are zero.
Comparing the region gains we have that
ΩJ∗2,t > Ω
J∗
1,t > Ω
J∗
0,t > 0 (50)
ΩJ∗1,t > Ω
J∗
0,t > Ω
I∗
2,t (51)
Case (2): T Jt > η+(1− η)T It It is symmetric to the case (1), so we have
sg,I,It = s
g,I
t ; s
g,J,I
t = s
g,J
t and s
g,JJ
t = s
g,I,J
t = 0
From A = 0 ; B = b
h
1 +
sg,Jt
sg,It
i
≥ b
we have
e∗∗gIt =
b+ (1 + r∗) c− b
h
1 +
sg,Jt
sg,It
i
£
1− T Jt
¤
b
≤ e∗gIt ≤ e∗It (52)
e∗∗gJt =
a+ (1 + r∗) c£
1− T Jt
¤
b
≤ e∗gJt (53)
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it is straightforward to verify that
e∗Jt ≥ e
∗∗gJ
t > e
∗gJ
t (54)
T ∗∗It = 1−
h
E − e∗∗gIt
i
+ 1
g(e∗∗g,It )
R E
e∗∗gIt
g
¡
ei
¢
dei,t ++Z
0(·)h³
e∗∗gIt − 1
´
− s
g,J
t
sg,It
i < T ∗It (55)
Comparing the region gains we have
ΩJ∗1,t > Ω
J∗
0,t > Ω
J∗
2,t (56)
ΩI∗2,t > Ω
J∗
1,t > Ω
J∗
0,t> 0 (57)
Case (3): T Jt = η + (1− η)T It This is the autarchic case. The solutions
are
sg,I,It = s
g,I
t ; s
g,J,I
t = s
g,J
t ; s
g,J,J
t = s
g,J
t and s
g,I,J
t = s
g,J
t
A = a ; B = b
e∗∗gJt = e
∗gJ
t ; e
∗∗gI
t = e
∗gJ
t
T ∗∗It = T
∗I
t ; T
∗J
t = T
∗∗J
t (58)
We have the same results of the autarchic case.
ΩJ∗0,t= Ω
J∗
2,t= Ω
I∗
0,t= Ω
I∗
2,t> 0 (59)
We can resume the results of the BI in the following game in compact form23.
T gJt = η − ε T
gJ
t = T
∗∗gJ
t = T
∗gJ
t
T gIt = 0 Ω
I
2,t
(case1)
; ΩJ2,t
(case1)
ΩI2,t
(case2)
; ΩJ2,t
(case2)
T gIt = T
∗∗gI
t = T
∗gI
t Ω
I
2,t
(case1)
; ΩJ2,t
(case1)
ΩI1,t
(case3/Gvt)
; ΩJ1,t
(case3/Gvt)
were ε > 0 and ε→ 0
The only NE sub game perfect equilibrium is T gJt = η + ε and T
gI
t = 0.
This NE is not PO. The coordinated solution, T gJt = T
∗∗gJ
t = T
∗gJ
t and T
gI
t =
T ∗∗gIt = T
∗gI
t is the only PO solution of this game.
23The true compact form is
T gJt < T
∗∗gJ
t T
gJ
t = T
∗∗gJ
t
T gIt < T
∗∗gI
t
T gIt = T
∗∗gI
t
Each value of 0 > T gJt < T
∗∗gJ
t and 0 > T
gI
t < T
∗∗gI
t is strongly dominated by
T gJt = η and T
gI
t = 0 which are sub game perfect equilibrium.
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The following propositions summarize the results obtained in this section.
Proposition 2 Let us assume that (i) the educated workers can migrate with-
out restrictions inside a union and there is not migration outside the union; (ii)
the regions inside are not symmetric (diﬀerent initial technology); (iii) in the
previous period there is not taxation and there is not education subsidies (or
there is the same fiscal policy); (iv) there is a positive role for the government
in the decisions of education for agents. The absence of coordination on fiscal
policies and the opportunistic behavior of the jurisdictions imply a mechanism
of FC which generates the Prisoner Dilemma’s. The only NE sub-game perfect
equilibrium is zero taxation and zero subsidies for the weaker region and positive
taxation/subsidies otherwise. Taxation for the stronger region is T gJt = η − ε
(with ε→ 0) where η it is a measure of the technology gap among regions. Fur-
thermore, if η ≤ T ∗gJt , then this NE is not PO because it is strongly dominated
in Pareto’s mean by the NE obtained if there is coordination and where there is
a positive value of taxes and subsidies [prop. (1)]
Let us now analyze diﬀerent coordination policies24.
1) Optimal level of subsidies and taxes. The presence of a Central
Authority which imposes to each region the optimal level of subsidies and taxes
for each region generates the optimal solution. If the CA imposes T JMaxt and
T IMaxt , the maximum level of taxation/subsidies for each region, then we can
have the maximum level of welfare for each region independently if there are
diﬀerent technologies. It is the optimal solution because all the negative eﬀect
of the fiscal competition is eliminated.
2) Minimum level of taxation/subsidies (Tmin) Let us assume that
the CA can not impose to the governments of the union the optimal level of
taxation but it is only able to impose a minimum level of subsidies and so of
taxation. Let us assume that Tmin it is lower of TMaxt . Two diﬀerent cases can
be now distinguished when a > b.
2.a) Tmin is equal in all the Union.
In this case the government’s final decisions can be resumed in the following
game in compact form
T gJt = T
min T gJt = T
∗∗gJ
t = T
∗gJ
t
T gIt = T
min ΩI2,t
(case1)
; ΩJ2,t
(case1)
ΩI2,t
(case2)
; ΩJ2,t
(case2)
T gIt = T
∗∗gI
t = T
∗gI
t Ω
I
2,t
(case1)
; ΩJ2,t
(case1)
ΩI1,t
(case3/Gvt)
; ΩJ1,t
(case3/Gvt)
24It is important to specify that in the following paragraphs when we indicate the diﬀerent
typology of coordination we do not refer only to the taxation policies. In fact, by the assump-
tions of the model, taxes and subsidies are linked by a direct proportionality function.
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The only NE sub game perfect equilibrium is T gJt = T
min and T gIt = T
min .
if Tmin > η or it is T gJt = η and T
gI
t = T
min if Tmin < η. This Equilibrium
is not PO respect the optimal solution and does not Pareto improve respect
to the NE achieved without coordination. If we impose a coordination that do
not take in account the diﬀerent level of technology damages the weakest region.
This region not only looses all its educated workers but must supply a minimum
subsidy (linked to the Tmin) to its workers whiteout receiving a gain from this
investment25.
2.b) Tmin is diﬀerent between regions.
In this case the government’s final decisions can be resumed in the following
game in compact form
T gJt = T
min
J T
gJ
t = T
∗∗gJ
t = T
∗gJ
t
T gIt = T
min
I =
TminJ −η
1−η Ω
I
2,t
(case3)
; ΩJ2,t
(case3)
ΩI2,t
(case2)
; ΩJ2,t
(case2)
T gIt = T
∗∗gI
t = T
∗gI
t Ω
I
2,t
(case1)
; ΩJ2,t
(case1)
ΩI1,t
(case3/Gvt)
; ΩJ1,t
(case3/Gvt)
The only NE sub game perfect equilibrium is T gJt = T
min
J and T
gI
t = T
min
I =
TminJ −η
1−η . This Equilibrium is not PO respect the optimal solution. If T
min
J > η
then this NE is Pareto improvement respect the NE achieved without coordina-
tion. This is the “second optimal” solution. More TminJ is closed to T
∗gJ
t , more
the second optimal is closed to the optimal solution.
These cases are depicted in figure (4)
The results obtained in this section can be summarized by the following
propositions.
Proposition 3 Let us assume that the CA is able to impose the optimal level
of subsidies and taxes for each region, it follows that the coordination between
jurisdictions implies a new NE which is Pareto improvement respect the non
coordination NE. The CA imposes the maximum level of taxation/subsidies for
each region T JMaxt and T
IMax
t . This Equilibrium is PO and it can be defined as
the “optimal solution” for the CA.
Proposition 4 Let us assume that (i) the CA is not able to impose the optimal
level of subsidies and taxes for each region but only to impose a minimum level
of taxation (or subsidies to educated); (ii) this minimum is the same for all the
regions; (iii) the regions are asymmetric; it follows that the coordination between
jurisdictions implies a new NE which is not Pareto improvement respect the non
coordination NE. In this asymmetric case, the coordination which do not take
in account the diﬀerent level of technologies damages the weakest region.
25In this asymmetric case, it is possible obtain the “second optimal” solution (case 2.b)
only by use a transfer from the strongest region in way to refund of the subsidies that aren’t
covered by the tax.
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Figure 4: ”Diﬀerent technology scenario” with minimum tax specific for each region.
Proposition 5 Let us assume that (i) the CA is not able to impose the optimal
level of subsidies and of taxes for each region but it can only impose a minimum
level of taxation (or subsidies to educated); (ii) this minimum is not the same for
all the regions but is defined by this relationship TminI =
TminJ −η
1−η . Then follows
that if η < TminJ the coordination between jurisdictions implies a new NE which
is Pareto improvement respect the non coordination NE. This Equilibrium is PO
and can be defined as the “second optimal” solution for the CA.
4.1 Mobility case in the “same technology scenario”
Let us now analyze the scenario in which a = b, i. e. initially the regions have
symmetric characteristics. The individual’s optimal decision do not change
respect the asymmetric scenario. Their future wage is related to the taxa-
tion/subsidies policies of the governments and to diﬀerences of technology be-
tween regions. It is straightforward to verify that the educated workers prefer
to stay in region J if
T Jt <T
I
t (60)
We can therefore distinguish three diﬀerent states of the world. Using the
BI we can analyze the government decisions for each diﬀerent state of the world.
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Case (1): T Jt < T
I
t Comparing the region gains we have
ΩJ∗2,t > Ω
J∗
1,t> Ω
J∗
0,t> 0 (61)
ΩJ∗1,t > Ω
J∗
0,t> Ω
I∗
2,t (62)
Case (2): T It > T
J
t It’s symmetric to the case (1), so we have
ΩJ∗1,t > Ω
J∗
0,t> Ω
J∗
2,t (63)
ΩI∗2,t > Ω
J∗
1,t> Ω
J∗
0,t> 0 (64)
Case (3): T Jt = T
I
t We have the same results of the autarchic case.
ΩJ∗0,t= Ω
J∗
2,t= Ω
I∗
0,t= Ω
I∗
2,t> 0 (65)
We can resume this three cases in the following game in compact form26
T gJt = 0 T
gJ
t = T
∗∗gJ
t = T
∗gJ
t
T gIt = 0 Ω
I
0,t
(case3/noGvt)
; ΩJ0,t
(case3/noGvt)
ΩI2,t
(case2)
; ΩJ2,t
(case2)
T gIt = T
∗∗gI
t = T
∗gI
t Ω
I
2,t
(case1)
; ΩJ2,t
(case1)
ΩI1,t
(case3/Gvt)
; ΩJ1,t
(case3/Gvt)
The only NE sub game perfect is T gJt = 0 and T
gI
t = 0. This Equilibrium
is not PO. The coordinated solution, T gJt = T
∗∗gJ
t = T
∗gJ
t and T
gI
t = T
∗∗gI
t =
T ∗gIt it is the only PO solution of this game. The results obtained in this section
can be summarized by the following propositions.
Proposition 6 Let us assume that (i) the educated workers can migrate with-
out restrictions inside a union and there is not migration outside this union;
(ii) regions inside are symmetric (same initial technology); (iii) in the previous
period there is not taxation and there is not educational subsidies (or there is
the same fiscal policy); (iv) there is a positive role for the government in the
decisions of education for agents. It follows that the absence of coordination on
fiscal policies and the opportunistic behavior of the jurisdictions imply a mech-
anism of FC which results in a Prisoner Dilemma’s situation. The only NE
sub-game perfect is zero taxation and zero subsidies for both regions. This NE
is not PO because it is strongly dominated in Pareto’s mean by the NE obtained
if there is coordination and where there is a positive value of taxes and subsidies
[prop. (1)].
26Each value of 0 > T gJt < T
∗∗gJ
t and 0 > T
gI
t < T
∗∗gI
t is strongly dominated by
T gJt = 0 and T
gI
t = 0 which is sub game perfect equilibrium.
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In the analysis of diﬀerent coordination policies it is straightforward to see
that the only diﬀerence between the symmetric and asymmetric cases are when
the CA can impose only a Tmin.
5 Mobility case (enlarged case)
Let us assume that a new State enters inside the union27.
Let us assume that the wage per eﬃciency unit of labor of this economy is
always lower than the wage inside the union independently of the specific fiscal
policy and technology characteristics of each region inside the union.
In the following sections we analyze the model in presence and in absence of
a central coordination.
5.1 New entry in a union with central coordination
Let us assume that when the new region (N hereafter) is admitted inside the
union the mobility of its educated workers is not perfect but there is a probability
of a successful emigration in the region J , πJ with J = A,B, that is independent
of the number of workers who are eligible to migrate28. Furthermore, we assume
that emigration policy is fully anticipated. In accordance with the previous
section, we assume that π = 1 for educated workers of the union. We assume
that π < 1 and that it is very small for workers of region N . This assumption
can be justified by the presence of strong mobility costs (pecuniary and social).
Each region of the union can influence π by migration policies that remove this
costs. The CA collects the migration policies of the region inside the union and
decides the optimal value of πU for the region N .
When there is a probability of emigrating and earning a higher wage, the
agent’s educational decision becomes an expected utility problem. For simplic-
ity, we assume that agents are risk neutral, that only the educated workers can
migrate and that all the other assumptions of the previous section are verified29.
Let us define
λ
¡
sNt−1
¢
wN (k) ≡ wNk (66)
as the wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor for the educated of region N .
By assumption, in each period we have that
wU > wN (67)
27This analysis can be extended without changing the results to the new entry of most
regions.
28This assumption follows from the small country hypothesis.
29Same distribution of ability, same education costs, etc.
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where
wU ≡ argmax
©
λ
¡
sJt−1
¢
wJ (k)
£
1− T Jt
¤
;λ
¡
sIt−1
¢
wI (k)
£
1− T It
¤ª
(68)
the best wage rate per eﬃciency unit of labor available inside the union.
The optimal decision for agent i born in N will be to invest in education if
£
πUwU + (1− πU )
¡
1− TNt
¢
wN
¤
ei > wN + c (1 + r∗) (69)
Thus, all agents with a latent ability greater than e∗N will invest in education,
were e∗ is uniquely defined by the following equality:
e∗Nt =
wNt + (1 + r
∗)
£
c− γNt
¤£
πUwU + (1− πU )
¡
1− TNt
¢
wNt
¤ (70)
As in the previous analysis it is possible to identify a positive value of taxes
0 < TNt ≤ TMaxt such that e∗Nt is lower than the case whiteout government
subsidies. Where
TMaxt =
γNt (1 + r
∗)
£
πUwU + (1− πU )
¡
1− TNt
¢
wNt
¤
(1− πU )
£
wNt + (1 + r
∗) c
¤ (71)
The average proportion of educated people in the economy N is given by
the following,
sNt =
(1− πU )
R E
e∗Nt
g
¡
ei
¢
dei
1− πU
R E
e∗Nt
g (ei) de
(72)
If π = 1 then the source economy loses all his educated workers and sNt = 0.
If π = 0 then there is not migration inside the union. Thus, a suﬃcient condition
for the existence of a positive level of BD such that the source economy benefits
in terms of productivity is that
dsNt
dπ > 0 when π = 0. The optimal level of π
will be given where
dsNt
dπ = 0. Diﬀerentiating equation (72) we obtain
dsNt
dπ
=
∂sNt
∂π
+
∂sNt
∂e∗Nt
∂e∗Nt
∂π
(73)
where
∂sNt
∂π
= −
R E
e∗Nt
g
¡
ei
¢
dei
h
1−
R E
e∗Nt
g
¡
ei
¢
de
i
h
1− πU
R E
e∗Nt
g (ei) de
i2 < 0 (74)
∂sNt
∂e∗Nt
= −
¡
1− πU
¢
g
¡
e∗Nt
¢h
1− πU
R E
e∗Nt
g (ei) de
i2 (75)
∂e∗Nt
∂π
= −
©
wNt + (1 + r
∗)
£
c− γNt
¤ª £
wU −
¡
1− TNt
¢
wNt
¤£
πUwU + (1− πU )
¡
1− TNt
¢
wNt
¤2 < 0 (76)
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Setting πu = 0 and noting that
R E
e∗Nt
g
¡
ei
¢
dei
h
1−
R E
e∗Nt
g
¡
ei
¢
de
i
is at most
a quarter, we obtain the results summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 7 In presence of CA inside the union which decides the optimal
value of πU , it is possible have a positive optimal level of BD emigration if
g
¡
e∗Nt
¢ {wNt +(1+r∗)[c−γNt ]}[wU−(1−TNt )wNt ]
[(1−TNt )wNt ]
2 >
1
4 and 0 < T
N
t ≤ TMaxt .
This proposition states that the source economy can benefit from the BD in
the extent that there are a suﬃcient number of people who would be entitled
to invest in education. The introduction of taxes and subsidies changes the
suﬃcient condition found by Mountford. There are two diﬀerent results. The
subsidies increase the number of educated workers and so decrease the proba-
bility for the new entry to be in the “optimal BD conditions”. Furthermore, the
taxes increase the wage diﬀerentials between the entry region and the others
and so increase the probability to gain from the BD.
Let us consider the case of uniformly distributed abilities
g
¡
ei
¢
=
1
E
(77)Z E
e∗Nt
g
¡
ei
¢
dei = 1− e
∗N
t
E
(78)
dsNt
dπ
> 0 iﬀ
¡
1− πU
¢ wU − ¡1− TNt ¢wNt
πUwU + (1− πU )
¡
1− TNt
¢
wNt
>
µ
1− e
∗N
t
E
¶
(79)
Thus, a BD will increase the proportion of educated people in the economy
if π is low, if wU is very high relative to
¡
1− TNt
¢
wNt and if the proportion of
educated people in the economy was previously low.
Equation (79) implies that when abilities are distributed uniformly, if wU is
large enough there is a positive level of πU such that next period productivity
increases in the source economy.
As in Mountford (1997), in presence of an optimal migration policy under a
BD, the return function st = ψ (st−1) is everywhere above the return function
compared with the case of no emigration. Thus clearly an optimal emigration
policy will increase the short and long run productivity in the source economy.
Finally, if there are multiple steady state equilibria then a temporary emigration
policy might lift a source economy from a low to a high education steady state.
The figure (5) despicts these results
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Figure 5: despicts the dynamics of the economy when there is a unique steady state equi-
librium for the case where there is not migration and when there is optimal emigration (Ψ0
is the case with optimal taxation and Ψm is the case without taxation).
5.2 New entry in a union without central coordination
Let us assume that there is not a CA and that each region of the union decided
independently the value of π maximizing his own welfare and do not take in
account the welfare of the region N .
Let us assume that 0 < π < πmax with πmax < 1.
Let us define ΨJt a measure of the welfare of region J .
ΨJt ≡ ΩJt + Γ(πJ) with J, I = A,B (80)
were ΩJt is the same function defined in (8) and Γ(π
J) is the “brain drain
gain” for the region J deriving by the attraction of educated workers of region
N. We define
Γ(πJ) ≡ πJsN,Jt
"
λ
¡
sJt−1
¢
w (k)
Z E
e∗Jt
dei,t
#
+ Z(πJsN,Jt ) (81)
Where πJsN,Jt is the number of agents which are educated in region N at
time t and work in region J at t+1. The first expression on the right hand side
of (81) denotes the total production of region J due to the presence of educated
workers coming from region N . The second term is an increasing function of the
number of educated agents and denotes all the other gains (not only pecuniary)
that the presence of new educated workers gives to region J . Let us assume
that Γ(·) ≥ 0, Γ(0) = 0 and Γ0(·) > 0.
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It is straightforward to show that
If πJ > πI then Γ(πJ) = πJsNt
"
a
Z E
e∗Nt
dei,t
#
+ Z(πJsNt ) (82)
and Γ(πI) = 0 (83)
If πJ < πI then Γ(πJ) = 0 (84)
and Γ(πI) = πIsNt
"
b
Z E
e∗Nt
dei,t
#
+ Z(πIsNt ) (85)
we also assume that
If πJ = πI then Γ(πJ) =
1
2
πsNt
"
a
Z E
e∗Nt
dei,t
#
+
1
2
Z(πsNt )
and Γ(πI) =
1
2
πsNt
"
b
Z E
e∗Nt
dei,t
#
+
1
2
Z(πsNt ) (86)
Let us define the timing of the model.
Time t The government N decides Tt and γt and each agent i decides whether
to invest in education or not according to their latent ability ei. Agents
investing in education receive γt and borrow c− γt from capital markets.
Governments J and I decide π.
Time t+ 1 The educated agents decides whether to migrate or not. They pay Tt to
the government of the region in which he works and they repay the debt
of the first period of the life.
Time t+ 2 All agents retire and use their savings to consume.
It is possible to solve the maximization problem through the BI method.
The optimal decision for agent i born in N is uniquely defined by e∗N (eq.
70)
For simplicity, we analyze only the optimal decision of government J and I
about the value of π. Hence we focus our attention on the “migration compe-
tition” inside the union. It is straightforward see that all these analysis can be
extended to the fiscal competition between the two regions without changing
the results.
Each government of the union maximizes the value of Γ(π) and it is straight-
forward see that, without coordination the only NE sub game perfect of this
“migration competition” is
πJ = πI = πmax > πU (87)
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The government N decides Tt and γt according to the optimal decision of
the agents (70) and of the region inside the union (87). In the previous section,
the CA collects migration policies of the region inside the union and decides
the optimal value of πU for the region N . Therefore, we have a “positive Brain
Drain” if we are in the condition delineated in the proposition (7). When
there is not coordination, then there is a “migration competition” between the
governments inside the union which involves in a value of π > πU , the value of
π is too high to have positive externalities from BS also for the region N . In
this case the BD had negative eﬀect on the growth of the region N and their
optimal decision is to have zero subsidies.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we introduce a role for the government in the educational decisions
of the agents through the introduction of educational subsidies and taxation.
This make it possible to study BD and FC in a unified framework and analyze
the impact of the absence of coordination inside the EU. In Section 3, we solve
the model in an “autarchic context” and we obtain the optimal level of taxation
and subsidies [Proposition 1]. In Section 4, we solve the model in a “restricted
mobility context” where there is perfect migration of the educated worker inside
the EU. The FC among the regions destroyed the positive externalities due to
the subsidies. According to the literature, the FC causes a fall in the provision
of public goods. [Proposition 2]. For the presence of a CA which coordinates
the fiscal policies, it is necessary to obtain the welfare and growth gains due to
the subsidies. [Proposition 3, 4 and 5]. In Section 5, we solve the model in a
“enlarged mobility case” where there is a new entry inside the EU. If the mobility
of the educated workers of the new entry are not perfect and can be influenced
by the “migration policies” of the former members of the EU, then the absence
of coordination implies a “migration competition” where the region inside the
union tries to attract educated workers of the new entry. This competition
increases welfare and growth loss for the new entry due the BD even if there
are the condition to have a “gain from the BD” [Proposition 6].
In this paper, we have analyzed a simple model in which we show that, if we
analyze the BD and the FC, the absence of coordination implies two negative
externalities. First, the FC decreases taxation and causes a fall in the provision
of public goods in all the regions of the EU (either for the former region either
the new entry). Second, the FC can lead to in a “migration competition” which
increases the “welfare and growth loss” due to BD.
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Extensions of the model
The model presented in this paper can be extended in order to analyze
diﬀerent economic and political analyses.
1. We can introduce a “mobility cost” for the educated workers. This cost
can be not only referred to the pecuniary costs directly linked to the mi-
gration (transport, new house, etc.) but also it can be referred to the “non
pecuniary cost” indirectly linked to the migration (live in a new nation,
diﬀerent language, etc.). The introduction of this costs do not change the
main results obtained in this paper but there are some important results:
• The more are the “mobility cost”, the less is the role of FC.
• While the “pecuniary cost” are normally similar between the diﬀer-
ent regions, on the contrary the “non pecuniary costs” can be very
diﬀerent and they can be directly influenced by the policies of the
government. These diﬀerences may increase or decrease eventually
technology’s diﬀerences and so the FC and BD externalities. Fur-
thermore, by decreasing these costs, the government of the former
region inside the EU can try to attract the educated workers of the
new entry (migration competition).
2. We can introduce a “enlarged role of the government”. In this paper we
have analyzed a government which do not take in account redistribution
income policies. If we consider a new version of the social welfare function
that the government want maximize then we have other important results:
• The FC implies not only less provision of public good but also less
income redistribution. This results, in according to the FC literature,
is due to the fact that each government decreases the tax in order
to attract the educated worker and so it must decrease the income
redistribution.
• If we analyze the redistribution policies, then we must take in account
also the “non educated” migrations. The risk to attract many non
educated workers implies less income redistribution and so increase
the negative externalities of the FC.
3. We have analyzed the impact of the FC and BD when the new entry region
has just decided to be in the EU. It is also possible enlarge this analysis by
studying a new step in which the new entry decides even if it is convenient
be a member of the EU.
4. We can substitute the assumption that the abilities of children are inde-
pendent from the abilities of their parents with the assumption of exter-
nalities of education of the precedent education. In this case we obtain a
more realistic model with more rich dynamics and we increase the negative
externalities due to the FC. Otherwise, the main results showed before do
not change.
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